How likeness should be considered in things

Ηow likeness should be considered in things

Ηow likeness should be considered in things

 

Likeness should be considered upon things that belong to different genera, that is, as one thing is to some one thing, so is another to another. E.g. as knowledge stands to knowable, so stands perception to perceptible (they are both cognitive of their objects). And as one thing is in some one thing, so is another in another. E.g. as sight is in the eye, so is intellect in the soul (viz. capacities). And as calm is in the sea, so is stillness in the air (each of them is a rest). Continue reading “How likeness should be considered in things”

The various ways a falsehood is spoken of

The various ways a falsehood is spoken of

The various ways a falsehood is spoken of

 

Falsehood is spoken of in one sense as a thing which is false, and that in two ways: either because it is not or cannot be formed (in language), as when we say that the diagonal is commensurable or that you are sitting (in these the former is always false, the latter sometimes), or, secondly, as things which exist, but are such by nature as to seem either not to be such as they are or to be things that are not, such as a sketch or a dream. For these things do have some nature, but not the sort of nature their impression creates. Thus, then, things are called false, either because they themselves do not exist or because the impression derived from them does not exist. Continue reading “The various ways a falsehood is spoken of”