Tag Archives: imagination
It remains, then, to inquire the way in which the soul moves the body, and what is the origin of the animal’s motion. For the ensouled, save the motion of the universe, are responsible for the motion of the rest, providing not to move by each other through bumping against each other. This is why all their movements have a limit, since so do the motions of the ensouled. For all animals are both movers and being moved for the sake of something, so that this is the limit of all their motion: the for-the-sake-of-something.
We also see that what produce motion to animal are intellect, imagination, choice, will, and wish. And all these can be reduce to intellect and desire. For both imagination and perception possess the same place as intellect; for both of them can distinguish, but are different in things that we have discussed in previous works of ours. Again will and spiritedness and wish are all sorts of desire, whereas choice is common to both intellect and desire. So the first mover is the object of desire and the one of thought — not every object of thought, but the end of things that are concerned with actions. Hence the mover is of this sort of good, but not whatever is fair; for it is on the ground that something else is for its sake, and in so far as it is the end of things that are for the sake of something else that can produce movement. We must also take as good whatever seems to be so, as well as the pleasant; for it is an apparent good.
If indeed imagination is that in virtue of which we say that an image comes about to us and not as when we say something metaphorically, then it is some kind of faculty or capacity, by virtue of which we judge and say the truth or the untruth. Such are perception, belief, scientific knowledge, and intellect.
That imagination is not actually a perception is clear from the following. For perception is either a faculty or an activity, as sight and seeing are, while there are certain things that appear to us even when neither of these two is present, just as whatever happens to us during our sleep. Moreover, perception is always present, imagination not. But if these two were the same in respect of the activity, then it would be possible for all animals to imagine; but it seems that this is not happening, as it is with the ant or bee or grub. Next, perceptions are always true, while imaginations are for the most part false. Furthermore, we do not say, when we act on a perceptible object accurately, that this object does not seem to us to be a man; rather when we do not have a distinct perception of it, and then it is either true or false. And just as we were saying before, even with our eyes closed visions appear to us too.