Tag Archives: desire
It remains, then, to inquire the way in which the soul moves the body, and what is the origin of the animal’s motion. For the ensouled, save the motion of the universe, are responsible for the motion of the rest, providing not to move by each other through bumping against each other. This is why all their movements have a limit, since so do the motions of the ensouled. For all animals are both movers and being moved for the sake of something, so that this is the limit of all their motion: the for-the-sake-of-something.
We also see that what produce motion to animal are intellect, imagination, choice, will, and wish. And all these can be reduce to intellect and desire. For both imagination and perception possess the same place as intellect; for both of them can distinguish, but are different in things that we have discussed in previous works of ours. Again will and spiritedness and wish are all sorts of desire, whereas choice is common to both intellect and desire. So the first mover is the object of desire and the one of thought — not every object of thought, but the end of things that are concerned with actions. Hence the mover is of this sort of good, but not whatever is fair; for it is on the ground that something else is for its sake, and in so far as it is the end of things that are for the sake of something else that can produce movement. We must also take as good whatever seems to be so, as well as the pleasant; for it is an apparent good.
It seems at any rate that these two are responsible for movement: either desire or intellect, if someone would consider imagination as a kind of thinking; for many people follow their imaginations in spite of their knowledge, and beside this in all other animals neither thinking nor reasoning reside, but imagination does. Both these, therefore, are responsible for movement in respect of place, namely intellect and desire, yet practical intellect, and the one which reasons for the sake of something; for it differs from contemplative intellect in respect of the end. But every desire is also for the sake of something; for that to which desire refers is the beginning of the practical intellect, and the point whereat our thought comes is the beginning of the action. So it is with reason that these two seem to be responsible for movement, desire and practical thought; for the object of desire causes movement, and because of this thought causes movement too, in that it is its start. But also when imagination starts a movement it does not do so without desire. So what produces movement is numerically one, i.e. the object of desire.