Of things that are, some are said of a subject, and are not in a subject, e.g. man is said of a subject, the individual man, but is not in a subject; others are not said of a subject, yet they are in a subject. By “in a subject” I mean what is incapable of existing separately from what it is in, and is not as a part of this thing; for example the individual grammar is in a subject, the soul, but is not said of a subject, and the individual white is in a subject, the body — for all colors are in a body — but is not said of a subject. Again, others are said of a subject and are in a subject, e.g. scientific knowledge is both in a subject, the soul, and it is said of a subject, the body; others are neither in a subject nor are said of a subject, e.g. the individual man or the individual horse — since nothing of this sort is either in a subject or said of a subject. Generally, those that are individual and numerically one are not said of any subject, however nothing prevent some of them from being in a subject, since the individual grammar belongs to things being in a subject.
That ethical virtue, then, has to do with pleasures and pains is evident. And since ethical character, as its name implies, has its growth from habit, and what is conducted by a conduct not innate is habituated by moving many times in a certain way — this is how it stands what can operate, a case we do not see in inanimate things (for not even if you throw a stone upwards a thousand times will it ever rise upward unless by constraint) — let ethical character be a quality of soul in accordance with governing reason, a quality belonging to the irrational part of the soul that is capable of following the reason.
With regard to rebutting an accusation, one way is to attempt wherefrom you could dispel the bad impression formed of yourself; for it makes no difference at all whether this impression has been openly expressed or not, so that this forms a general rule.
Another way is to respond to the disputed points saying that it is not the case, or not harmful, or has nothing to do with you, or not that much or unjust or great or disgraceful or important (for dispute has to do with such matters), as did Iphicrates to Nausicrates — he confessed that he had done what Nausicrates said, but not that he had done him wrong. Or to counterbalance the wrongdoing, that is to say if it is harmful but noble, painful but useful, or anything of the sort.
There are three things which one must have in order to be credible; for this much is the number of those by which we believe in, save demonstrations. And these are wisdom, virtue and favour. For people are deceived in what they say or advise either by all these or by one of these; for either through lack of wisdom their judgement is at fault, or they do make a good judgement but through viciousness they do not say what they think, or they are wise and virtuous, but not friendly. This is the reason why one may not give the best advice, although he knows what it is. And these are the only possible ways. It follows, then, that he who is thought to possess these three qualities is necessarily credible to his audience.
The persuasive means of a rhetorical speech are of three kinds. One party is situated on the moral character of the speaker, another on disposing the hearer accordingly, and a third on the speech itself, in so far as it proves or seems to prove.
It is by means of the moral character of the speaker, when the speech is so spoken as to render the speaker credible; for we believe sooner and in a greater degree the virtuous, generally in everything, but in matters where we are not certain or there is room for dispute, our confidence is absolute. And this ought to come about on account of the speech itself and not by what we think of the speaker’s character beforehand. For it is not the case, as some writers do in their text books of rhetoric, that the rectitude of the speaker does not contribute at all to his power of persuasion, wherefore they did not include it into the art, but perhaps, we might say, the moral character of the speaker plays a leading part in persuasion.
The kinds of rhetoric art are three in number; for this much is the number of the listeners of rhetorical speeches too. A rhetorical speech consists of three parts: of the speaker, of what one says, and of the person to whom it is addressed, while the end of the speech refers to him, I mean the listener. The listener, therefore, must be either a spectator or a judge, and a judge either of what is done or of what is about to be. And it is the member of the assembly that judges what is about to be, the juror what is done, and the spectator the skill of the rhetorician. Hence, there must be three kinds of rhetorical speech: deliberative, forensic, and epideictic speech.
The deliberative speech either exhorts or deters, since those who counsel either aside or publicly in the assembly do one of these two. The forensic speech either accuses or defends; for litigants necessarily do one of these two. The last one the epideictic speech either praises or blames.
Favour seems to be friendship, but is not the same as friendship; for favour occurs both towards strangers and without their knowing it, but not friendship — these have been discussed earlier. But it is not love either, since it has no intensity or desire, elements that are both present in love. Besides, love involves intimacy, whereas favour may occur all of a sudden, as it is for instance with athletes; for we come to be favourable to them and to share the same wishes, but we would not do anything for helping them; for, as we have said, we come to be favourable suddenly and love them only superficially.
Understanding or lack of understanding in virtue of which we call men “men of understanding” or “men void of understanding”, are neither entirely the same as scientific knowledge or opinion (for in this case all men would have been men of understanding), nor are they one of the particular sciences, such as medicine concerning the objects of health, or geometry concerning magnitudes; for understanding is concerned neither with what is eternal and unchangeable nor with whatever comes to be, but with things about which one may be puzzled and deliberate. For this reason understanding deals with the same things as practical wisdom but are not the same; for practical wisdom dictates what we ought to do or not to do, which is its end, whereas understanding only judges. For understanding is identical with good understanding (the former implies the later), and men of understanding with men of good understanding.